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APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Appellant, James Constructors, Inc. ("James"), submits this 
reply brief for the purpose of answering new matters that were 
raised in the brief of respondent, Salt Lake City Corporation 
(the "City"). 
The City has argued that, (1) James made no showing before 
the district court which would suggest the existence of any issue 
of fact relative to dismissal of its complaint; (2) theories of 
rescission and quantum meruit are raised for the first time on 
appeal; (3) the question of ambiguity of the contract was not 
raised in the court below; and (4) the court lacks jurisdiction 
because James?s notice of appeal was not filed within the time 
required by Rule 4, Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
Whether there are issues of fact that would preclude grant-
ing of summary judgment is implicit in every motion for summary 
judgment, because one cannot be granted unless there is no genu-
ine issue of material fact. Moreover, James's "Memorandum in 
Opposition to Salt Lake City Corporation's Motion for Partial 
Summary Judgment," devotes thirteen paragraphs to facts it con-
tends have a bearing upon the interpretation of the contract. In 
those thirteen paragraphs, contract provisions are cited which 
suggest an ambiguity in the contract in that they appear to be 
contrary to contractual provisions relied upon by the City 
(R.64-70). It is certainly clear that James and the City take 
differing views of the interpretation of the contract based upon 
various contractual provisions. 
The complaint filed by James refers specifically to the 
wrongful termination of its contract with the City (R.5), and 
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paragraph 22 of the complaint sets out conduct of the City which 
constitutes total breach of the contract (R.7). 
The City's argument that the question of which party had the 
duty to select bedding material and backfill is involved only in 
the complaint of the City against James, which has not yet been 
determined, is not correct. Paragraph 10 of James's complaint 
raises the very question of who had the duty to determine which 
material was to be used for bedding and backfill (R.4). 
On page 13 of its memorandum (R.66), James argued to the 
trial court that it was entitled to rescission of its contract 
and compensation in quantum meruit for the services performed. 
James was not obligated to appeal from the judgment entered 
on May 4, 1988, inasmuch as that judgment was modified by a sub-
sequent judgment entered on June 1, 1988. The trial court had 
jurisdiction to enter the judgment of June 1, 1988, and if it did 
so erroneously, because the amendment came after the ten-day 
period prescribed by rule, this was error only and did not affect 
the jurisdiction of the appellate courts. Moreover, if it were 
error, it was invited error, the City having prepared and pre-
sented to the court the findings of fact, conclusions of law and 
judgment entered June 1, 1988; and if it were error, it is error 
that is being raised for the first time on appeal and should not 
be considered by the court. There was no cross-appeal. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Questions of Ambiguity of the Contract and Whether There 
Was Any Genuine Issue of Material Fact Were Properly Before 
the Trial Court, and Were Not Raised for the First Time on 
Appeal. 
Rule 56(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, sets out the con-
ditions for granting a summary judgment: 
* * * The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and 
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, 
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact 
and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a 
matter of law. * * * 
The City has suggested in its argument that there was no 
issue of fact because no affidavit was filed by James, but affi-
davits are not necessary if factual matters are shown by the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admis-
sions on file. Here the record is replete with discovery accom-
plished prior to the hearing on the motion for summary judgment, 
and deposition testimony is appended to James1s memorandum. The 
very fact that James referred these factual matters to the court 
suggests that there are issues of fact bearing upon interpreta-
tion of the contract. There are many cases in which 
cross-motions for summary judgment are made, each party contend-
ing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the 
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. But the fact 
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that both parties so contend does not relieve the court of its 
obligation to determine whether there is a genuine issue of mate-
rial fact, because the absence of such an issue is the sine qua 
non for summary judgments. In Amjacs Interwest, Inc. v. Design 
Associates, 635 P.2d 53, 55 (Utah 1981), our Supreme Court, 
speaking through Justice Stewart, said: 
As an initial consideration, we know that the filing of 
cross-motions for summary judgment does not mean that this 
case may be finally disposed of as a matter of law. 
Cross-motions for summary judgment do not ipso facto dissi-
pate factual issues even though both parties contend for the 
purposes of their motion that they are entitled to prevail 
because there are no material issues of fact. 
The opinion then quotes a particularly apt statement from 6 
Moore1 s Federal Practice 11 56.13 at 341-344 (2d Ed. 1976). 
II. 
Questions of Restitution and the Right to Recover on a Quan-
tum Meruit Theory Were Not Raised for the First Time in this 
Appeal. 
The City has argued that the question of who had the obliga-
tion to determine whether bedding and backfill material was suit-
able for use on the project was not involved in James's claim 
against the City, but only in the City's claim against James, 
which has not yet been determined. 
James's complaint (R.3-5) contains the following averments: 
7. Defendant's engineer or other representatives were 
required to test the native soil removed from the pipeline 
trench to determine its suitability for bedding and 
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backfilling purposes. Defendant was under a duty to inform 
plaintiff of the soil test results and failed to do so. 
8. Pursuant to the contract, plaintiff was obligated 
to compact all bedding and backfill material to comply with 
standards set forth in the contract documents. Defendant's 
engineer or other representatives were required to test the 
compaction of the bedding and backfill to determine compli-
ance with the the contract specifications. Defendant was 
under a duty to inform plaintiff of the compaction test 
results and failed to inform plaintiff of any deficiencies 
concerning compaction test results in a timely manner. 
• * * 
10. Defendant was under a duty to authorize the plain-
tiff to use bedding material, imported backfill material 
when native material would not meet contract specifications. 
Defendant breached this duty to plaintiff, resulting in cer-
tain areas of trench failure and possible damage to the 
pipe. 
The following points were raised in James's memorandum to 
the trial court: 
1. Responsibility for selection of bedding and backfill was 
placed on the City by the terms of the contract (R.658); 
2. The City is responsible for any failure due to insuffi-
ciency of the native bedding and backfill and impliedly warranted 
that the native bedding and backfill specified in the contract 
was sufficient (R.660); 
3. James was entitled to rely upon results of compaction 
tests communicated to it by representatives of the City (R.662); 
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4. Exculpatory contract boiler plate contained in the gen-
eral provisions cannot modify the contract technical provisions 
(R.665); 
5. James was entitled to rescission of its contract and to 
compensation in quantum meruit for services performed (R.666); 
6. James is entitled to payment for extra work claims 
alleged in its complaint under a theory of quantum meruit 
(R.668). 
At R.669 it is pointed out in the argument that the City's 
action constituted a repudiation or total breach of the contract. 
III. 
The Notice of Appeal was Filed Within the Time Required by 
the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
An order of partial summary judgment was entered by the 
court on May 4, 1988, but it was not a final judgment because it 
did not dispose of the entire case. Thereafter, on May 17, 1988, 
the court signed and filed a certificate as required by Rule 
54(b), U.R.Civ.P., which made the judgment of May 4, 1988, a 
final judgment for purposes of appeal. Almost immediately ques-
tions were raised by James as to the form of the judgment, though 
this was done by letter rather than a motion to amend. However, 
because of the provisions of Rule 1, Utah Rules of Civil Proce-
dure, the objections made in the letter should be interpreted as 
-7-
a motion to amend the judgment. The letter and a response to it 
by the City were filed within the time required by Rule 59 for 
amendment of a judgment (R.983). 
Thereafter, the City submitted to the trial judge proposed 
findings of fact and conclusions of law and a new order of par-
tial summary judgment, which were signed and entered on June 1, 
1988. The City argues that the time to appeal ran from the date 
of certification under Rule 54(b), that the notice of appeal 
filed on June 21, was too late, and that this court, therefore, 
has no jurisdiction to decide this appeal. It is the position of 
the City that what it calls the "duplicative order" of June 1, 
1988, had no effect upon the running of the time for appeal. 
The judgment entered on June 1, however, was the last judg-
ment entered in this case and one which amended the judgment of 
May 4, 1988, at least with respect to the date of the judgment. 
None of the cases cited by the City involved a situation in 
which the final judgment was entered after the certification. At 
first glance, the Kansas case, Dennis v. Southeastern Kansas Gas 
Co. , 227 Kan. 872, 610 P.2d 627 (1980), seems to support the 
City's position in that the date of certification commenced the 
running of the appeal time although a summary judgment was filed 
three days later; but under Kansas law, a judgment becomes final 
and appealable upon the filing of a "journal entry," which in 
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Dennis occurred on the same date as the certification. 
Even assuming that the letter sent to the court cannot be 
treated as a motion to amend, and that the court's entry of the 
new judgment on June 1, 1988, constituted error because it was 
entered beyond the ten days for amendment of a judgment as 
prescribed by Rule 59, the error did not affect the jurisdiction 
of the Supreme Court or this court. 
The 30-day period within which to file an appeal is set by 
Rule 4, Rules of Utah Supreme Court, but filing the appeal within 
the time provided by that rule is not a jurisdictional require-
ment because Rule 1(d), Rules of the Utah Supreme Court, 
provides: 
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the 
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as established by law. 
Article VIII, Sec. 3, Utah Constitution, specifies that the 
Supreme Court "shall have appellate jurisdiction over all other 
matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to 
issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the 
Supreme Court's jurisdiction or the complete determination of any 
cause," and under 78-2-2, Utah Code 1988, the Supreme Court has 
appellate jurisdiction over "all orders, judgments, and decrees 
of any court of record over which the court of appeals does not 
have original appellate jurisdiction." 
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Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court has already ruled on the 
question of jurisdiction. 
After filing of the appeal, the City filed with the Utah 
Supreme Court on July 26, 1988, a motion for summary disposition 
and dismissal of the appeal. Point III of the motion raised 
exactly the same question that the City is raising now, i.e., 
that the notice of appeal was not timely because it was not filed 
within thirty days after certification of the judgment on May 17, 
1988. 
On August 19, 1988, the Utah Supreme Court issued the fol-
lowing order: 
Salt Lake City Corporation's motion for summary disposition 
and dismissal of appeal is this date denied, and the case is 
reserved for plenary review. 
Inasmuch as this court has jurisdiction, the only argument avail-
able to the City is that the court's amendment of the judgment on 
June 1, 1988, was error. But the City is in no position to claim 
error because it did not cross-appeal the court's amendment of 
the judgment. Moreover, if there were error, it was invited by 
the City's submission of the findings, conclusion and judgment 
entered on June 1, and invited error may not be relied upon for 
reversal of a judgment. Pettinqill v. Pekins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 
P.2d 185, 186 (1954); 5 Am. Jur.2d, Appeal and Error, 
§ 713. 
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CONCLUSION 
The issues raised in James's brief are issues that were 
raised before the trial court, though sometimes in slightly dif-
ferent terms, and are properly before this court for review. The 
court has jurisdiction to review them, James's appeal having been 
perfected. The appeal should be disposed of on its merits, and 
the case remanded to the District Court of Salt Lake County for 
trial. 
Respectfully submitted, 
B Q O B £ Roe (SlgnN) 
Bryce E. Roe 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN, A 
Professional Corporat 
Attorneys for Appellant 
James Constructors, Inc 
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